118 Stern (nr. 8) 111–12; B. Stern, “Responsabilité internationale et succession d`État”, in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes und Vera Gowlland-Debbas (Hrsg.), The International Legal System in Quest of Equity and Universality, Liber amicorum Georges Abi-Saab (M. Nijhoff 2001) 335; Udina (No. 26) 677–8; Michael John Volkovitsch, “Righting the Wrongs: Towards a New Theory of State Succession to Responsibility for International Crimes”, (1992) 92(8) Colum L Rev 2164-5; Degan (No. 45) 300-301. 131 Einige Schriftsteller betrachten sie nicht als eigenständige Kategorie: Degan (Nr. 45) 298–9. Siehe auch: Restatement (Third), Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Vol I (American Law Institute Publ. 1987) § 210, Reporters` notes no. 4 (p. 113).
In bestimmten Fällen ergeben sich andere Überlegungen. If one of the States concerned claims continuity, the retention of the former nationality may be more frequent, but if the outcome cannot be very different from that of inheritance cases.77 The question of the legality of population transfers (apart from the voluntary exercise of option rights) may also arise.78 This book, based on the author`s thesis, aims to: present inheritance law as it is and not as it should be. Traditional subjects are valued (debt, pure sea principle, public property and acquired rights) and succession in terms of contracts is carefully studied (customary law, state practice). The entire study is detail-oriented and condensed. 3. Distinction between State succession and State identity 1.18 1.06 In addition to the fact that the issue of sovereign succession has not been frequently raised in the past, investment tribunals may have been reluctant to venture into uncharted territory without the necessary investigative skills and theoretical knowledge. After observing this phenomenon, Tams published a groundbreaking article in 2016 entitled “State Succession to Investment Treaties: Mapping The Issues”.17 He described his article as “an overview of sovereign succession issues that arise in the context of investment agreements”.18 He added, however, that the article was not intended to allow readers to “discuss specific issues in depth.” but to “inform the debate on a particularly sensitive area of international law that investment lawyers now face”.19 Tams is clearly too modest about the results of his article. In fact, it offered readers much more than just an overview of relevant legal issues.
It paved the way for further analytical studies in the future on this currently underdeveloped area of law. I followed his suggestion to pursue the matter further. Indeed, the purpose of this book is to provide a comprehensive guide to sovereign succession issues that arise in the context of investment arbitrage. The goal is to ensure that arbitrators and policymakers faced with complex issues of succession to BITs and government treaties no longer have to venture to the other side of the library just to find old and (literally) dusty books on the subject. The hope is that they can find answers to their questions in this book. 1.29 Finally, changes in the name of a State are clearly not decisive for questions of identity.65 It is true, however, that the fact that a State retains its name despite changes in its territory may be regarded as an element of continuity in that it shows (to some extent) its desire to preserve its original international legal personality.66 However, It is not the other way around. Since a state adopts a new name as part of territorial transformation, it simply cannot be automatically inferred that it is in fact a new state.67 In the event of succession, membership in the UN is therefore not transferred. When, by voluntary submission or merger, one State is completely absorbed by another State, the succession is universal or total. It implies the complete assimilation of one international personality to another.
Other rights and obligations: Other rights and obligations such as the nationality of the citizen, obligations towards the new authorities and the State are taken into account. According to UN guidelines, the newly created State has the right to choose its nationality, but reality says otherwise. 1.25 All authors agree that a State does not necessarily lose its international legal personality by changing territory.44 It is clear that territorial losses in themselves do not affect the identity of a State.45 This principle has been (perhaps surprisingly) described by one author as a “habit”.46 The existence of the legal personality of a State can be affected only if: if the loss of territory is total.47 This is, for example, what happened to Poland in 1775, when it ceased to exist due to its territorial division between Austria, Prussia and Russia. On the other hand, a limited loss of territory does not affect the identity of a state.48 An example of this is that the France did not cease to exist when the territory of Alsace-Lorraine was ceded to Germany in 1871. The same conclusion applies to the identity of Germany when the same territory was returned to France in 1918. There are two important examples of partial succession. After the secession of four of the six constituent republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991 and 1992, the rump state, renamed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, declared the continuation of the state of Yugoslavia – against the objections of the newly independent republics. Belgrade`s representatives continued to occupy the original Yugoslav seat at the UN, but the United States refused to recognize it. The rest of the territory of the federation represented less than half of the population and territory of the former federation. In 1992, the Security Council decided on 19 September (resolution 777) and the General Assembly on 22 September 1992.
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia dissolved the new federation on the grounds that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had dissolved. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (later renamed Serbia and Montenegro) became a Member of the United Nations in 2000; In 2006, Montenegro declared independence and Serbia continued to occupy the seat of the federation. In addition, Kosovo declared independence in 2008. According to this theory, the rights and obligations of the State continue to exist even after succession by another State. In 1882 von Gierke had published an article on the exercise of the rights and duties of a social corporation after its dissolution. From this, Max Huber derived his theory of organic substitution. Huber made the analogy that the problem of state succession is similar to that of the dissolution of a social institution. A succession of States can be characterized as universal or partial. Universal succession exists when a State is completely extinguished and its sovereignty is replaced by that of one or more successor States. A partial succession of States exists when the State continues to exist after losing control of part of its territory. [3] This impressive work is the classic French on the succession of states.
Succession in all aspects of debts, contracts and public property is examined through the analysis of case law, historical accounts (mainly Germany, the former USSR and Yugoslavia) and the study of the two Vienna Conventions. • the position of the successor State (after the date of succession) on the question of succession; 1.52 In summary, State practice and international jurisprudence relevant to the following six different types of State succession are examined separately (according to the same typology recently adopted by the Institute):146 1.22 It should be added, however, that the classification of two entities as “identical” at two different times is, of course, a legal fiction.35 The state that exists after the events, is not necessarily completely “identical” to what existed before the territorial changes. Thus, the question of continuity itself arises, as there may be doubts as to whether two entities are really identical. In other words, there can be no question of continuity if the borders of a State have not been changed in the slightest. For example, no one doubts or questions the existence of a state identity between France in 2010 and France in 2012: it is clearly the same state. The relevant question to be asked, therefore, is not whether two entities are per se “identical”, but rather whether, despite substantial changes in its territory, name and government, they can be considered `the same` state (with the same international legal personality).36 As Stern explains, “This situation iribly evokes two childhood friends who meet again after fifty years of separation and states: “You haven`t changed, you`re still the same!” Essential identity, beyond existential changes”.37 In other words, a state may well remain the same in its “essence”, but at the same time have changed in its secondary characteristics. This issue will be discussed in more detail in the next section. Treaties: Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, 1978; was adopted to deal with laws relating to treaties between States. When discussing treaty-related issues, the question was whether the newly created State should be bound by all treaties signed by the predecessor State. Well, to answer that question, a codified customary principle has developed, which states that treaties relating to the border are binding on the next State and cannot be amended. Secondly, when discussing human rights treaties, the general discussion is that the successor State is not obliged to follow, the successor State should have the right to decide whether or not to proceed with the treaty.