On the other hand, intra-agency disclosures to recipients who do not need the information to perform their duties are inappropriate. See, for example, Parks v. IRS, 618 F.2d 677, 680-81 & n.1 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that plaintiffs had a viable right to disclosure of the names of employees who had not purchased promotional savings bonds); Dick v. Holder, 67 F. Supp.3d at pp. 177-178 (the conclusion of the “need to know” exception did not allow a “Be on the lookout” warning to law enforcement officials outside DOJ or the agency “without proof of why each employee needed to receive the information”); Carlson v. GSA, No. 04-C-7937, 2006 WL 3409150, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 21, 2006) (explains that the email sent by the supervisor to employees explaining the reasons for the applicant`s dismissal does not fit within the “need to know” exception because the supervisor “encouraged [the employee] to share [the email] without restriction” and “expressed personal satisfaction with [the employee`s] dismissal”); MacDonald v. VA, No. 87-544-CIV-T-15A, op. cit. at 8-9 (A.F. 28 July 1989) (retaining disclosure of consultation note in a “ruthless attempt to discredit and injure the employee” is inappropriate); Koch v. United States, No. 78-273T, op. cit. 1-2 (W.D.
Wash. 30 December 1982) (it is not appropriate to keep the letter of termination posted in the lobby of the Agency); Smigelsky v. USPS, No. 79-110-RE, op. cit. at 3-4 (D. Or. Oct. 1, 1982) (on the grounds that publication of workers` reasons for taking sick leave is inappropriate); Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 1 Gov`t Disclosure Serv.
(P-H) ¶ 80,232, at 80,580 (N.D. Ga. August 22, 1980) (disclosure that the employee`s absence was due to “mental health problems” is inappropriate; “Suppressing rumours and gossip [and] the satisfaction of curiosity must not be equated with a need to know”), partially cleared for other reasons and remanded in custody, 665 F.2d 327 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Walia v. Napolitano, 986 F. Supp. 2d 169, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that the applicant “reasonably claims that the disclosure of his equal employment opportunity complaint was not made on a need-to-know basis in order to enable employees to perform their duties”); Bigelow v.
DOD, 217 F.3d 875, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J., deviant) (interpretation of DOD regulations to establish that the supervisor did not need to formally review the safety record of the individual`s personnel under his or her supervision); Boyd v. Snow, 335 F. Supp. 2d 28, 38-39 (D.D.C. 2004) (rejection of summary judgment if there are “serious questions” as to whether the applicant`s counter-statement to her performance evaluation was communicated to certain employees in the applicant`s office on a “need-to-know” basis); Vargas v. Reno, no. 99-2725, slip op.
cit. at 3, 12-13 (W.D. Tenn. March 31, 2000) (rejection of summary judgment if there is insufficient evidence that disclosure of the applicant`s file to the Inspector General investigating another employee was based on the officer`s “need to know”); cf. Berry v. Henderson, No. 99-283-P-C, 2000 WL 761896, p. *1, 3 (D. Me.
8 May 2000) (noting that the Agency`s examination of the personnel and medical records in its possession in the context of its defence in the case of Title VII was not sufficient in paragraph (b)(1)). Notwithstanding the exemptions required for disclosure under the FOIA and disclosure by consumer reporting agencies, the disclosure provision of the Privacy Act does not provide for non-consensual disclosures governed by other legislation, and agencies should rely on the exception for routine disclosure of use for such disclosures. However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit clarified that certain distributions of protected materials to individuals with prior knowledge of their existence or content are “disclosures” within the meaning of the Privacy Act. Pilon v. DOJ, 73 F.3d 1111, 1117-24 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In Pilon, the D.C.
Circuit found that the Department of Justice`s submission of a document protected by the Privacy Act to a former employee of the Agency constituted a “disclosure” under the Privacy Act, even if the recipient had come into contact with the [document] as an employee “in the course of his or her duties.” Id. The Court`s review of the objectives, legislative history, and integrated structure of the Privacy Act convinced that Congress intended the term “disclosure” to apply in virtually all cases to the unauthorized transfer of a subject matter protected by an agency, whether or not the recipient previously knew of it.